Iran Nuclear Watch: The IAEA Report – “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran”

Supporters of the Iranian opposition and resistance cheer with the release of confetti near the United Nations, as they learn that the Belgium government plans to reconsider its Iran policy, Friday April 28, 2006 in New York. Protesters are calling on the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran which defied a deadline to stop uranium enrichment and becoming a potential nuclear threat. The poster on left is of Maryam Rajavi, President Elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)

Vital Perspective: IAEA Report Shows Iranian Defiance Continues

The IAEA report on the Iranian nuclear program is quite damning and points out the 20 years of Iran’s deception and its total unwillingness to answer for conduct. It discloses that Iran has been working on advanced P-2 centrifuges â€“ as Ahmadinejad bragged about last week â€“ revealing a previously unknown secret track toward nuclear bomb fuel, outside of that which the IAEA had been following previously. P-2 centrifuges are more sophisticated and reliable, making it easier for Iran to ramp up the production of enriched uranium.

Read the entire IAEA Report on the Iranian Nuclear Program.

READ IT ALL.

From the IAEA Report:

B. Current overall assessment14

33. All the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency is accounted for. Apart from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, the Agency has found no other undeclared nuclear material in Iran. However, gaps remain in the Agencyâ€™s knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iranâ€™s centrifuge programme. Because of this, and other gaps in the Agencyâ€™s knowledge, including the role of the military in Iranâ€™s nuclear programme, the Agency is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

34. After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iranâ€™s nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern. Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active cooperation by Iran â€” transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol â€” if the Agency is to be able to understand fully the twenty years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran. Iran continues to facilitate the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and had, until February 2006, acted on a voluntary basis as if the Additional Protocol were in force. Until February 2006, Iran had also agreed to some transparency measures requested by the Agency, including access to certain military sites.
Additional transparency measures, including access to documentation, dual use equipment and relevant individuals, are, however, still needed for the Agency to be able to verify the scope and nature
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13 GOV/INF/2006/1.
14 A detailed overall assessment of Iranâ€™s nuclear programme and the Agencyâ€™s efforts to verify Iranâ€™s declarations with respect to that programme was most recently provided to the Board of Governors by the Director General in February 2006.
See GOV/2006/15, paras 46â€“54.
GOV/2006/27

Page 8

of Iranâ€™s enrichment programme, the purpose and use of the dual use equipment and materials purchased by the PHRC, and the alleged studies which could have a military nuclear dimension.

35. Regrettably, these transparency measures are not yet forthcoming. With Iranâ€™s decision to ceaseimplementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol, and to confine Agency verification to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agencyâ€™s ability to make progress in clarifying these issues, and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, will be further limited, and Agency access to activities not involving nuclear material (such as research into laser isotope separation and the production of sensitive components of the nuclear fuel cycle) will be restricted.15

36. While the results of Agency safeguards activities may influence the nature and scope of the confidence building measures that the Board requests Iran to take, it is important to note that safeguards obligations and confidence building measures are different, distinct and not interchangeable. The implementation of confidence building measures is no substitute for the full implementation at all times of safeguards obligations. In this context, it is also important to note that the Agencyâ€™s safeguards judgements and conclusions in the case of Iran, as in all other cases, are based on verifiable information available to the Agency, and are therefore, of necessity, limited to past and present nuclear activities. The Agency cannot make a judgement about, or reach a conclusion on, future compliance or intentions.

37. The Agency will pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iranâ€™s nuclear activities, and the Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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15 In this context, it is important to recall that, in September 2005, the Director General informed the Board of Governors that certain aspects of Iranâ€™s declarations would be followed up as a routine safeguards implementation matter (particularly in connection with conversion activities, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and the heavy water research reactor programme)
(GOV/2005/67, para. 43). Implicit in this statement was the understanding that the Agency would be able to follow up on these matters through the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. With the suspension of Iranâ€™s voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, the Agencyâ€™s ability to do so will be restricted.

So, after thirty days of waiting, Iran has resumed uranium enrichment, is expanding their program, and preparing to more speedily enrich uranium for possible diversion to a weapons program.

The IAEA says Iran is not transparent enough. In other words, they are hiding something.

Duhhh…….

While the United States has been waiting for diplomacy, Iran is forging ahead with an enhanced uranium enrichment program with P-2 centrifuges, that may yield them a nuclear weapon within a years time – maybe sooner.

The United Nations Security Council must take action – but they won’t.

Watch the United States pursue a Chapter 7 Resolution next week and Russia and/or China obfuscate and delay.

The nuclear ball is clearly in President Bush’s court.

The “POINT OF NO RETURN” is close at hand.

Stay tuned……